

**APPENDIX 1:**  
**Draft “Guiding Principles paper”**

**– pre-workshop version 15<sup>th</sup> March 2007**

**Guiding Principles for achieving  
impact through policy change  
A resource for researchers**

**[Draft version only – not for quotation]**

This version of the ‘Guiding Principles’ paper has been prepared ahead of the Process and Partnership project’s regional workshop on March 27<sup>th</sup>-28<sup>th</sup>. It draws mainly on the project case studies and wider work by ODI.

However, the discussions during the workshop will provide a vital input into the final version of this paper, to become a resource for researchers seeking to have more effective engagement with policy processes. This should therefore be considered very much a ‘**work in progress**’, and it is distributed ahead of the workshop as a stimulus for the discussions, and as a ‘template’ to structure exercises during the workshop.

## **Table of Contents:**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 1. Introduction:.....   | 3  |
| 1.1 What this document attempts to do:.....                           | 3  |
| 1.2 Who this document is for: .....                                   | 3  |
| 1.3 Guiding principles: .....   | 4  |
| 2. Background and analytical framework.....                           | 5  |
| 2.1 Background.....   | 5  |
| 2.2 Analytical approach.....  | 6  |
| 3. The case studies: .....  | 7  |
| Case study 1: Dairy marketing policy change in Kenya.....             | 7  |
| Case study 2: Urban agriculture policy change in Kampala, Uganda .... | 7  |
| Case study 3: Communal natural resource management in Tigray .....    | 8  |
| Regional seed trade and dairy marketing policy changes: .....         | 9  |
| From Case Studies to Guiding Principles .....                         | 9  |
| 4. Guiding principles for influencing policy change .....             | 10 |
| 4.1 Principles related to Political Context:.....                     | 10 |
| 4.2 Principles related to Evidence .....                              | 12 |
| 4.3 Principles related to Linkages .....                              | 14 |
| 4.4 Principles related to External Environment: .....                 | 16 |
| 4.5 Applying the principles: .....                                    | 16 |
| References:.....  | 18 |
| Resources: .....  | 18 |

# 1. Introduction:

## *1.1 What this document attempts to do:*

This paper is a short, preliminary version of a publication which aims to support researchers and research organisations in playing a more effective role in poverty reduction through policy-level changes. It has been produced as a ‘work-in-progress’, ahead of a regional workshop to be held in Nairobi in March 2007. The outputs from this workshop will then be used to further develop and expand this paper into a booklet entitled *Impact through Policy Change: How researchers can play a role*. The booklet is intended to be a resource for researchers to use for practical support when devising and implementing activities which aim to have some or all of their poverty-reduction outcomes working through policy change. It will complement other resources produced by ODI which are aimed more at civil society actors and public sector actors. However, as effective linkages seem to underlie most successful policy influences, and recognising that an understanding of the perspectives of the different actors is critical for all concerned to be more effective, this should also be a resource for other actor-types, in the same way as the other resources provide useful insights for researchers.

## *1.2 Who this document is for:*

Policy and practice should be informed by research-based evidence. Many types of organisation are involved in research<sup>1</sup> and the use of evidence in policy engagement. Many civil society organisations actively engage in policy-influencing activities, as do private sector actors, using evidence to back up their activities. However this publication is predominantly targeted at development-focused research organisations – meaning organisations whose prime activity is systematic investigation and evaluation of data related to development practice and policy. This can include a wide range of research approaches, such as action-research and consultations, as long as evidence is collected in a rigorous and systematic way.

This document will also be relevant for civil society organisations and public policy makers amongst others. But a number of resources have been recently produced which are tailored more specifically to the needs and activities of these actors in relation to policy engagement. [See the list of Resources at the end of this document.]

It is meant to be very accessible to people whose normal prime activity and focus is not necessarily on policy engagement, so the aim is to give general guiding principles on how to work in ways more likely to result in policy change, rather than providing a complex recipe book detailing all the steps which should be followed in particular circumstances. Indeed a key finding from our work in this area is that there can only

---

<sup>1</sup> We adopt a very general, though widely accepted, definition of research as ‘any systematic effort to increase the stock of knowledge’ (OECD 1981; see Court et al, 2006, and Sutcliffe & Court, 2006, for further discussion). This may include any systematic process of critical investigation and evaluation, theory building, data collection, analysis and codification related to development policy and practice. It also includes ‘action research’, i.e. self-reflection by practitioners oriented towards the enhancement of direct practice and ‘voice and consultations’. The key is that evidence is collected in a rigorous and systematic way.

really be general guidance, because policy processes are so context-specific, varying depending on country, sector, individuals and actors involved, and any number of internal and external factors, so that prescribed approaches are unhelpful. However, it is hoped that by following these guiding principles, and then selecting appropriately from links to a range of tools and approaches that can help both understanding of, and engagement in policy processes, the booklet will help researchers ensure that their evidence can indeed play an effective role in informing policy and practice in these complex processes.

### ***1.3 Guiding principles:***

The guiding principles for effectively achieving policy-related outcomes are based on the findings of a series of case studies carried out in East Africa by a collaborative ILRI/ODI project, backed up by a wider body of research conducted by ODI's Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) programme. Using research approaches designed to capture as much of the complexity of policy change processes as possible, and an analytical framework developed by RAPID to systematically analyse and understand these processes, the guiding principles have been found to be fairly consistent across a range of contexts and scales.

In order to actually apply the guiding principles in the real world, of course, specific actions must be taken. There are therefore some links to a number of 'tools' and approaches that may be appropriate, listed at the end of the document. These collections of tools and approaches are predominantly outputs of the RAPID programme. By referring to these more detailed sources, including 'toolkits', it should be possible to turn the 'guiding principles' into concrete strategies and action.

Also, within the case studies, particular approaches also provide useful illustrations of the specific approaches that have proved successful in that context. These can serve to illustrate the sort of approach that could be considered, with the proviso that although it seemed to work in that particular context, it may or may not be appropriate in another one.

## 2. Background and analytical framework

### 2.1 Background

Research-based evidence can and does play a key role in poverty-reduction and international development. But whilst few actors would deliberately set out to develop policies and institutions that were not based on evidence, the experience of many people is that apparently ‘good’ evidence is ‘ignored’ in policy processes, or that policies are developed based on pressures/interests that go against the evidence, or that despite attempts to influence policy based on research evidence, nothing changes.

This is partly explained by the realisation that conventional understanding of the role of evidence in policy processes has been shown to be vastly oversimplified. The traditional ‘linear model’ of research evidence, commissioned to address a problem, feeding into policy processes in order to solve the problem through a policy change, has been superseded with a range of alternative models, of increasing complexity. These have been well reviewed by de Vibe et al (2002) and Crewe and Young (2002).

There are now a growing number of initiatives seeking to understand the role of evidence in policy processes, and to inform the different actor types on how to play more effective roles in them. The Process and Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy Change (PPPPPC project) is one such project, implemented collaboratively by ILRI and ODI.

#### ***What do we mean by ‘pro-poor’ policy change?***

The term ‘pro-poor’ is often used to describe intended (occasionally achieved) outcomes including policy changes. The term is not easy to define, and harder to evaluate whether it has been achieved. For this project, the term was to indicate that the policy changes studied should be of benefit to poor peoples’ livelihoods (directly or indirectly). The concept of poverty however is broad, going beyond income poverty to include concepts of vulnerability and broader livelihood issues.

A difficulty in assessing ‘pro-poor policy change’ is that the impacts on poor people’s livelihoods are likely to follow some time after the actual change. And when a change has occurred some years previously, the influences on the change may be harder to determine – especially given the complexity of most policy processes. For most of the case studies conducted, the policy change has been relatively recent, and the actual impacts on the poor have not been evaluated. Case studies were however selected, following wide consultation, to cover policy changes which were expected to have positive impacts on the poor, based on evidence from the research leading to them or broader evidence of the importance of particular sectors for the poor. This was because the objective of the project was to understand the change process itself. The links between the policy change and impacts on the poor requires its own analysis, which was beyond the scope and resources of this project. Such an analysis is however being done separately for two of the case studies – the Kenya dairy example (ongoing ILRI case study) and the Kampala urban agriculture example (ongoing KUFSAALCC/Urban Harvest study).

The background to the PPPPPC project was in seeking to learn lessons from an apparently successful engagement in policy change in Kenya, so that other researchers

within the institute could benefit from the experiences. But the project developed into a wider activity to carry out a number of case studies in different East African countries, broadening the basis for the lessons, and also the target audience.

Four case studies were eventually carried out, looking at the following areas:

1. Changes in dairy marketing policies in Kenya
2. Development of new City Ordinances on urban agriculture in Kampala
3. Development of a state-level policy of distribution of communal hillside land to individuals to manage in Tigray, Ethiopia
4. Attempts to rationalise and harmonise regional policies on (i) seed trade and (ii) dairy marketing in East Africa

[For more background and information on this project, go to [www.pppppc.org](http://www.pppppc.org).]

In carrying out these case studies, and drawing out lessons, the research team were able also to draw on the more extensive work that ODI's RAPID programme have been carrying out. The RAPID programme has been working since 2002 on some key issues around evidence in policy processes:

- How can policy-makers best use research, for evidence-based policy-making?
- How can researchers best use their findings in order to influence policy?
- How can the interaction between researchers and policy-makers be improved?

In addressing these issues through research, advice and debate, the programme has been working on four main [themes](#):

1. [The role of evidence in policy processes](#);
2. [Improved communication and information systems for policy and practice](#);
3. [Better knowledge management and learning for development agencies](#);
4. [Approaches to institutional development for evidence-based policy](#).

[For more information on the RAPID programme, go to [www.odi.org.uk/rapid](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid).]

## ***2.2 Analytical approach***

The complexity of policy processes provides a challenge to attempts to understand them and the influences on them. In the course of its initial work, the RAPID programme developed an analytical framework that sought to capture the important dimensions of policy change processes, and in particular the role of evidence. This 'context-evidence-links' framework has been used for the analysis of the PPPPC project case studies, and also as the basis for categorising the lessons and guiding principles that have emerged. [See ILRI/ODI (2007)]

RAPID also worked with ILRI to develop a research approach to collect data for the case studies. The approach combined elements of three established methodologies:

1. Episode studies – tracking back from a policy change to identify and evaluate key influences and events.
2. Case study analysis – tracking forward from activities to assess their impact on policy change.
3. Outcome Mapping – looking at factors influencing behaviour of key actors.

Together these have been developed into the RAPID Outcome Assessment, or ROA, where information collected through literature review, interviews and workshop exercises can be assembled into a visual tool which illustrates influences and linkages in the process leading to policy change. There is a strong emphasis on the role of behaviour change of key actors, in addition to key events and activities. [More on the ROA and its application in these case studies can be found in ILRI/ODI (2007).]

### 3. The case studies:

The four PPPPPC project case studies are described in a series of case study briefs and in the full case study reports. A brief outline only is given here of each case, before the key lessons and guiding principles are illustrated with examples from the cases.

**N.B. The workshop will include short presentations and discussion on each of the four case studies. The case study briefs and full case study reports will also be available for participants.**

#### ***Case study 1: Dairy marketing policy change in Kenya***

Since 2004-5, there has been a significant change in policy and practice affecting dairy marketing in Kenya. This has significant relevance to the poor, as Kenya's dairy industry is based on smallholder production from almost 1 million households. Based on consumer demand for fresh 'raw' (unpasteurised) milk, the vast majority of milk has been marketed through small-scale traders, including mobile traders, who nonetheless operated outside the formal regulated market, and were regularly harassed and arrested. This caused significant problems for the majority of farmers, traders and consumers alike, affecting incomes and assets at all levels.

Based on an extensive array of relevant technical, marketing and policy evidence from a collaborative research and development project, the Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP), the consistent and innovative communication activities carried out by the project, and the advocacy efforts of a coalition of civil society organisations linked to the project, major changes in the approach of the regulatory bodies have occurred, including licensing and training of small-scale traders. Changes in written policy are also in progress, in this case following the changes in practice rather than preceding them.

In this case a major role in influencing policy change was played by a single research and development project, based on real and diverse collaboration, participatory research approaches, consistent and innovative communication and a degree of opportunism, in a sector that was thoroughly understood by the project.

**Case study report** (published): Leksmono et al. (2006) *Championing urban farmers in Kampala; Influences on local policy change in Uganda*.

#### ***Case study 2: Urban agriculture policy change in Kampala, Uganda***

In 2005, Kampala City Council passed a set of new City Ordinances which promoted the practice of agriculture within the city whilst still controlling the potential health and nuisance hazards associated with the practice. This was a significant change for a practice which, whilst being a hugely important livelihood strategy for the urban poor, especially women, is at best only tacitly accepted and usually actively discouraged in most developing country cities.

The process leading to this change is complex, and based on a number of influences. Research evidence that quantified the practice and its importance, and persistent efforts of some government and non-government actors to support those whose

livelihoods depended on it, kept the issue ‘live’ to the mid 1990s. But the key change of decentralisation and devolved law-making ensured that this awareness was backed up by popular pressure for change. Nonetheless, real concerns about public health and other perceived risks meant that little changed until a coalition of NGO, research and government actors pushed through a broad participatory consultation process that led to review of draft ordinances and the recently passed evidence-based new Ordinances.

This case demonstrates the importance of political context in providing the environment for change, but also shows the key role that can be played by coalitions of diverse actors, collecting and communicating evidence (both research-based and field-experiences) and how relevant evidence can be linked to popular pressure, supported by timely funds to overcome ‘bottlenecks’ in formal policy processes.

**Case study report** (published): Hooton et al. (2007) *Championing urban farmers in Kampala; Influences on local policy change in Uganda*.

### ***Case study 3: Communal natural resource management in Tigray***

In the highlands of Ethiopia, there are major problems related to land degradation and lack of productive land for a growing population. A huge amount of research has been conducted over the years seeking to address this, with often disappointing results. But in 1997, the Tigray regional government put forward a new policy promoting the subdivision of previously communal degraded land (predominantly hillside land) and its allocation to individuals to manage. These individuals, primarily landless youths, are able to benefit personally from the trees and crops they grow on this previously communal land.

Despite the huge amount of research that has been done into issues of management of common property, land degradation and increasing population, the stimulus for this change was a community-level initiative, with no apparent outside influence. Acutely aware of the problems they were facing in terms of both landlessness and land degradation, the initiative was started in one village (supported by the local administration) before spreading within the *woreda* (district). As more people became aware of the success of the initiative, it became the subject of internal case studies by the government agricultural offices, and fed into formal processes of strategy development. Ultimately the approach became a cornerstone of the 1997 Guidelines on hillside management, and having started as a completely ‘bottom-up’ initiative, started being promoted in a more ‘top-down’ way throughout the region.

This case as shown how small, local innovative ideas and initiatives can work through the existing community and local government structures to lead to policy change. In this case, research that had been conducted on these issues for many years seemed to have little if any influence on change at that level. The key influence is that a practical approach on the ground was seen address some major challenges faced by both communities and government. And as decisions on land use in Ethiopia are made by communities themselves, conventional communication of research evidence to ‘higher-level’ fora of government actors and researchers would seem to have limited relevance to the policy process.

**Case study report** (draft): Hooton & Hagos (2007) *Influences on natural resource management policy: How a community initiative led to new regional policies in Tigray*.

#### ***Case study 4: Regional seed trade and dairy marketing policy changes***

A short case study was also done into initiatives conducted by the Eastern and Central Africa Programme for Agricultural Policy Analysis (ECAPAPA) aimed at both rationalising and harmonising regional policies on seed trade and on dairy marketing. In both cases, significant constraints had been identified that prevented actors in those sectors from maximising their productivity and marketing success. The approach taken by ECAPAPA was basically one of systematic evidence gathering, backed with facilitation of regular meetings between the range of key actors in the sectors. Some significant changes in seed trade policies have occurred, reducing the time taken for variety release and certification, and reducing barriers to cross-border trade. Likewise for dairy marketing, there have been regional agreements on training and licensing of small-scale traders, broadly reflecting the changes in Kenya described above.

In both these cases, the sensitive ‘facilitation’ offered by ECAPAPA has proved a major influence in allowing the key actors to discuss and agree change, in a way that would be difficult or impossible without such facilitation. Actors came from private and public sector organisations, who were initially mutually suspicious. And exposing these key actors to robust and relevant evidence (even if much of it was not actually new), including allowing them to view practically the changes that had been piloted in individual countries, seemed to stimulate change once there was a degree of mutual respect and understanding.

**Case study report** (draft): Hooton (2007) - *Regional policy change processes in dairy marketing and seed trade policy in East Africa: An analysis of influences.*

#### ***From Case Studies to Guiding Principles***

These four case studies reflect different levels of policy-making, from local, in the case of Tigray and Kampala, to national in the case of the Kenya dairy story, to regional in the seed trade and dairy case. The policy processes in these different levels are significantly different – most notably in the ‘closeness’ of people who are most affected by the policies. There are also major differences in political and economic context in the different countries and sectors. And approaches in all four case studies, all of which resulted in significant policy change, have been very different. However, through applying the context-evidence-links analytical framework, and through having applied the broad-based research approach to capture diverse perspectives, the case studies do seem to suggest some key guiding principles.

The links between the research results, analysis and the emerging lessons, which have led to these guiding principles, are explained in detail in the case study reports, and readers are directed to these to fully understand the analysis and the links to the principles. For the purposes of this paper, the key guiding principles are now outlined, and illustrated by some specific examples from the case studies. The guiding principles also draw on the wider experiences captured by the RAPID programme.

Whilst the analysis and lessons drawn from the case studies cover all actors and influences, the guiding principles outlined below have been presented from the perspective of research organisations, and the particular role that research evidence has (or has not) played in the case studies and wider RAPID work.

## 4. Guiding principles for influencing policy change

These guiding principles are structured in line with the analytical framework, relating to Context, Evidence, Linkages and External environment. There is obviously some degree of overlap between the principles, and therefore cross-reference between sections.

Following several of these guiding principles are boxes that describe how these principles were found to have been applied in some of the project case studies. These are illustrative only, showing how in that particular context, a particular approach did or did not work. However they should not be taken as a model for applying the principles.

**N.B.** During the **project workshop**, the ‘guiding principles’ will be further explored, including drawing also on participants’ own experiences to develop the principles. This section is therefore meant to be a starting point for one of the main workshop activities.

### *4.1 Principles related to Political Context:*

**Effective engagement in the policy process requires a good understanding of the political context, so appropriate strategies can be utilised.**

This may seem a self-evident statement, but in reality a good understanding of the political and economic context is not easy to achieve. It seems especially challenging in the context of research activities, which are often led by actors with specialisms in narrow fields, who may be less aware of ‘bigger picture’ issues. The political and economic context itself may have a significant influence over what are the most relevant research questions to address. Thus understanding the context, and involving key actors in the early stages of research design is critical. Policy makers want practical answers to real issues that they face, and these issues are frequently (usually) more complex than the apparent technical or simple policy constraints that the research may aim to address.

In addition, understanding this political context, and possible strategies for engaging in it, may involve approaches and expertise that are very different from the skills of researchers in particular technical specialities. [This highlights the relevance of the ‘linkage’ principles described below]

However, a number of tools are available that can help to map political context (see the list of toolkits in the Resources section). Relevant approaches can be selected and applied early on in research project design.

**Important issues are likely to include:**

- How does the subject area fit with **wider political context and priorities**?
- Who are the ‘policy makers’ and what are their **incentives, roles and power**?
- How can **linkages** with them be made?
- Who can work with you?

- What are the **policy opportunities** ('policy windows' etc.)?
- How do international, regional, national and local policy processes, actors etc differ? How are they linked?
- How free to operate are various actors?

**Linking activities and evidence to ongoing and/or high-profile political strategies can be an effective way to get a new policy narrative on the agenda.** If politicians are espousing certain principles (e.g. employment generation, or a focus on women in poverty) and your evidence has something to say about these, it can provide a platform for the wider story to be told.

In the Kenya dairy case study, the new government's Economic Recovery Strategy stressed employment generation as the cornerstone of growth. This provided an opportunity to show how important the small-scale milk market was for supporting jobs. The Minister of Labour became a target for influencing and the issue of dairy broadened beyond a purely agricultural interest.

**Building credibility and being a regular and constructive part of policy dialogues can help organisations stimulate demand for them to be part of a process.** This can put research organisations in a very effective position. But it is likely to take time, rely on taking advantage of all available opportunities, and retaining a reputation for being objective and unbiased experts.

In the Kampala case and the Kenya dairy case, both KUFSAALCC and SDP became key actors that policy makers and sector stakeholders would proactively seek out to involve in consultations and other activities. In both cases the credibility of the coalitions had built up by providing robust, relevant contributions to sector discussions over months and years.

**In many cases, grass-roots pressure from voters and stakeholders can be hugely important in policy processes.** This may be direct, or indirect through different civil society organisations. Linking evidence to grass-roots organisations, usually indirectly through CSOs, can make the evidence work very effectively. [See 'linkage principles' below]. But the role of grass-roots organisations and CSOs is likely to vary between countries and contexts, so this again requires an understanding of the way civil society operates in the particular country and sector context.

The three country case studies provide very different examples of this grass-roots linkage. The Tigray case showed how communities can directly influence a policy-making body that itself has links to the grass roots – the BOARD. CSOs played little role. In the Kenya dairy case, CSOs played a vital role in linking farmer organisations into policy dialogues with policy makers who were quite removed from the grass roots. In Kampala, the closer linkages between politicians and their communities increased the impact of grass-roots pressure, though NGOs still played a key role in making these linkages more effective.

## 4.2 Principles related to Evidence

### 4.2.1 Relevance of evidence:

**Evidence obviously needs to be relevant to be influential. This implies a need to understand the real policy needs that can be addressed through research before and during the research activity.**

There is often still a tendency for research proposals to be based on (i) research institutes' or individuals' interest, expertise or previous work, or (ii) donor priorities. Both of these are important factors, but it is still critical to ensure that the direction of the activity is informed by the real policy needs. This implies an understanding of the policy situation ahead of proposal writing (made easier through appropriate networks and partnerships) and a further deepening of this understanding early in the activity. In this way there can be flexibility in changing the focus during the activity if necessary.

In the case of Kampala, the original PhD research done by Maxwell back in the early 1990s was informed by meetings with the Ministry of Agriculture and public health officials, who had identified areas they were interested in – namely the economic importance of the practice of urban agriculture, and nutritional benefit to children. By answering these key questions, in addition to the land and labour issues that were the focus of the research, the work became widely read amongst officials.

**Evidence is most relevant when it forms a complete picture** – in particular linking the ‘why change?’ answers (often based on socio-economic evidence) with ‘how to change?’ answers (based on more technical or policy-related evidence). Together, these can be more powerful and convincing for policy makers and policy implementers.

In both the examples from dairy in Kenya and Kampala urban agriculture, evidence on the importance of a practice for employment and incomes ensured that discussions were seen as relevant. But there were still perceived to be major technical (mainly public health) risks to both the practice of urban agriculture and permitting of trade in raw milk. The technical evidence, quantifying risks and identifying ways of minimising or eliminating them, then showed that these concerns could indeed be addressed. Either ‘type’ of evidence without the other would not have made this complete picture, and would arguably not have resulted in changes that occurred.

**Evidence also needs to be of the appropriate ‘type’ for the situation.** Robust **empirical** evidence can be very important in many situations, especially when convincing people such as public health officials. **Action-research** type evidence and **field visits** to show on-the-ground experiences also play a key role – both with politicians and with regulators, who are able to see with their own eyes how approaches may work in practice.

The cases from Ethiopia, Kampala and Kenya all demonstrate the importance of such visits. Farmers visiting the distributed hillsides saw the benefits for

themselves, and could ask relevant questions of the farmers in the initiating communities. Field visits were used for officials and regulators in Kampala (to see the social benefits of supporting agriculture) and in Kenya (to see activities training and certifying traders). It certainly seems true that “seeing is believing” in these cases.

#### 4.2.2 Credibility of evidence:

Research organisations generally do well on the ‘credibility’ of their evidence, compared for example with the perception that many CSOs advocate based on predominantly anecdotal evidence. **But it is important to take advantage of this situation to make the evidence really work, and also to take care not to have credibility weakened.** This is a particular risk in controversial situations, where those opposing the policy direction implied by the evidence may spend significant effort trying to discredit it.

It is also important to stress the importance of credibility of evidence with partners who may want to use evidence too early, or to ‘stretch’ the implications etc. Whilst other actors may be advocating based on the evidence, a key role for researchers is to ‘defend’ attacks on the credibility of the evidence – and by implication their own credibility.

#### **Credibility may need building over time with relevant policy process actors.**

Consistently being part of debates and always presenting relevant, robust evidence builds this credibility. And an unbiased and ‘non-advocating’ role may be important to maintaining the credibility of a research organisation in policy processes. This may mean making linkages with other actors (e.g. CSOs) who can advocate – and supporting them to use the evidence well to do so – leaving the research organisation out of controversial/contested areas.

In the Kenya dairy example, during the controversial ‘milk wars’ there was considerable pressure from the CSO partners for SDP to rapidly publish and distribute results and analyses. This pressure helped increase the speed of communicating results, but the researchers still insisted that figures and interpretations had to be accurate and the underlying methodology sound. This turned out to be hugely important as opponents spent considerable effort in trying – unsuccessfully – to discredit the evidence.

#### 4.2.3 Communication of evidence:

**Communication of evidence is critically important. This needs to be not only to ‘decision makers’ but also to whatever range of actors may play some influencing role.** Here, research organisations often have a poor record, with communication somehow not being seen as priority/responsibility. Communication should be prioritised from the beginning of the research – not something done at the end.

**Having understood the actors in the policy process from early analyses, there should ideally be specific efforts to communicate with each of the key stakeholder groups.** In reality, to be most effective, this may require a range of communication materials

Effective communication of evidence is a subject in itself, and this is an area where researchers can usefully buy in professional help, to turn the research outputs into materials that capture attention and effectively communicate the message to the range of actor types. Appropriate communication means are needed for different audiences **Language** will need to be more or less technical depending on the audience (politicians, technical implementers, advocacy partners, general public through media etc.). The **form** will again vary depending on audience. Meetings (small or large, targeted or general), briefs or various kinds, audio-visual, electronic media, or field-visits may all be appropriate in different situations. More conventional research reports and papers are still important for supporting these other means, and for credibility.

**One critically important aspect of communication is the way linkages are made** from the beginning of an activity. Effective linkages not only aid communication but represent a communication strategy in themselves. The importance of linkages is described in the following section.

All case studies show the importance of effective communication, and all demonstrate the diverse ways of communicating depending on the audience. Written materials, meetings, field visits, audio-visual face-to-face meetings – these all played roles.

**N.B.** A range of materials are available to help researchers communicate with policy makers: see the toolkits in the Resources section.

### ***4.3 Principles related to Linkages***

Effective linkages in research and communication activities seem to be extremely important in achieving policy change outcomes. Given the complexity of policy processes, and the number of different actors involved, this is no surprise. Yet research organisations often seem to perform poorly in terms of policy-relevant linkages. This may be owing to issues of incentives, time, and/or partnering ‘skills’.

However, the success stories from the case studies all seem to be predominantly about effective linkages.

**If policy influencing is an objective, research organisations need to understand who are the relevant actors in the policy process, both in terms of the targets for influencing and in strategic partners to work with in influencing.** This should be done early in a process, so effective linkages can be built – based on mutual benefit for strategic partners (bringing in additional capacity as necessary – political position, communication advantages etc.) and based on ‘interest’ for ‘targets’.

**Particular rewards can come from effective linkages between civil society organisations and research organisations.** When the capacity and skill for pro-poor advocacy of NGOs, together with linkages to grass-roots stakeholders, is backed up by robust research-based evidence, these can result in considerable pressure for change. These linkages may be sought by NGOs wanting to improve their evidence base, or by research organisations trying to ensure their evidence achieves better impact. But there are particular challenges faced by such collaboration. The nature of NGOs and many research organisations, in terms of focus, background of personnel and incentives for example, can be quite different, as well as differences in the way research and evidence approaches are viewed.

**Building and maintaining linkages requires time, resources and skills.** These should be factored in and budgeted for at the beginning of any activity, or experience shows that the linkages are unlikely to be successful.

Once established, maintaining partnerships can also be difficult – different values, approaches, accountability etc. can strain partnerships. When involved in influencing or advocacy, sharing a vision can be key to maintaining partnerships between diverse organisations.

**The time, resources and skills necessary for forming and maintaining effective partnerships cannot be underestimated, but experience from these case studies and others indicate that this is time and money well-spent.**

Once built up, linkages – whether respected membership of appropriate networks or more focused linkages – can be built upon for further activities.

**Different linkage ‘models’ may be appropriate in different circumstances, depending on context, individuals etc.** In some cases more formal partnerships may be appropriate, whereas in others a looser alliance based on common interest may be effective. Whilst the Kampala and Kenya case studies are both examples of highly effective collaboration, they are very different approaches.

**Personal relationships can be hugely important in making effective linkages, but time and effort should be made to ensure that these are also reflected in institutional ownership** and memory so that linkages don’t ‘die’ when individuals move on.

The Kampala case study shows an example of a highly effective coalition between organisations which was to a large extent in reality a coalition of individuals. The advantage in the beginning was that collaboration was possible even when parent organisations may have been reluctant to set up formal linkages. There were also very flexible but highly effective ways of working together throughout the collaborative activities, which could have been more difficult if constrained by formal linkages. However, one initial partner organisation, the National Agricultural Research Organisation, was effectively lost from the coalition when the key individual involved died, without there being effective inter-organisational linkages to maintain the role.

Nonetheless, as well as a coalition of individuals, there have been considerable and successful efforts to institutionalise the linkages within parent organisations. This has been easier following the recognised success of the group, and the high profile of urban agriculture since it received top-level political support.

#### ***4.4 Principles related to External Environment:***

Factors external to the policy process (and the key actors) can play important roles – both in a positive and negative way. It is difficult to generalise on the basis of a handful of case studies, but such factors can include donor influences. These are considered here as external factors, although clearly there can be close linkages with some key actors in a process.

**Donors can play an important role in encouraging and supporting actors who are ‘reluctant’ to get involved in policy influences.** This may be especially true for research actors, concerned about crossing the ‘boundary’ between research and development. This may be down to a lack of skills or confidence in such engagement, whilst donors may regularly act at this level.

In the Kenya dairy case, DFID’s positive engagement with the project during its implementation not only persuaded the project staff to get more engaged in policy influencing, but positively supported this through skills development and providing additional personnel.

Donors can also play a key role through providing funds in flexible ways when ‘bottlenecks’ occur in policy processes. By the very nature of these complex processes, potential bottlenecks are difficult to predict, yet can totally halt progress towards change.

In the Kampala case, DFID provided money from a research budget firstly to support a community consultation, and then to support the internal harmonisation and rationalisation process within the City Council. This was clearly not research, and yet without this innovative funding and support, it is likely that the research evidence would ultimately have failed to result in the change that did occur.

#### ***4.5 Applying the principles:***

For many readers who have been involved in poverty-focused research and development activities, few of these guiding principles will come as a particular surprise (although it is hoped that the links to approaches and tools, and descriptions of successful approaches may help address the problems in new ways). The importance of collaborative approaches, effective communication etc. are repeatedly flagged up, in relation to achieving impact through any route, not just through policy change. Some of these general principles take on particular dimensions and importance when the route of impact is expected to be through policy change – the challenge of communicating with policymakers and technocrats, or those that are in a position to lobby them, is different from the challenge of communicating with farmers, for example. And the external environment influences that must be

considered at policy level bring in dimensions of international norms, politics and trade issues amongst others.

However, the unfortunate reality is that common sense or not, these principles seem in most cases to be poorly applied. Effective linkages between key actors – for example between research organisations and NGOs – seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Whilst almost always flagged up at the beginning of activities (and usually a necessity for successful proposals) many people seem to experience partnerships as being more of a burden than a bonus, and being a drain on time – interfering with the work that needs to be done. Likewise, communication with ‘policy makers’ is often still an end-of-project activity based on presenting findings and recommendations – often the first time that people outside a project have heard about the work. And communication materials still seem to be minimally altered from the sort of researcher to researcher technical communications that many are most comfortable with. Good use of the media and effective communication of potential ‘solutions’ to decision makers is not common.

The reasons behind these failures will be explored during the upcoming workshop, and as potential ways forward to address constraints are identified, these will be incorporated into the final version of the booklet. Ultimately, effectively addressing the constraints is likely to involve institutional-level change in research organisations, the research community in general, and in the way research organisations are linked to the wider systems of policy processes at local, national and international levels. It is hoped that the final output of this work will be a useful resource to address these challenges.

**N.B.** This section on ‘applying the principles’ will be expanded based on the workshop discussions on this. In fact it is one of the key areas that we will explore. What is it that is preventing the different actor types from working in ways that could improve policy-level impact? And how can such constraints be addressed?

Also, how can resources, such as the booklet intended from this paper, be made most relevant and useful to support actors in their efforts?

We will also try to develop a list of organisations/activities working on this issue, and links to the range of resources and tools being developed to support better evidence-based policy making.

## References:

Crewe, E. and Young, J. (2002) *Bridging Research and Policy: Context, Evidence and Links* ODI Working Paper 173, September 2002. ODI, London  
<http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Publications/Documents/wp173.pdf>

de Vibe, M., Hovland, I. and Young, J (2002) *Bridging Research and Policy: An Annotated Bibliography* ODI Working Paper 174, September 2002. ODI, London.  
<http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Publications/Documents/wp174.pdf>

Hooton, N., Lee-Smith, D., Nasinyama, G. and Romney, D., in collaboration with Atukunda, G., Azuba, M., Kaweesa, M., Lubowa, A., Muwanga, J., Njenga, M. and Young, J. (2007) *Championing urban farmers in Kampala; Influences on local policy change in Uganda*. ILRI Research Report No. 2, in collaboration with ODI, Urban Harvest and KUFSAALCC. International Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya. 92pp.

<http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/documents/Kampala%20report%20final%20WEB.pdf>

ILRI/ODI (2007) *An approach to understanding the role of research in policy change processes*. Process and Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy Change – methodology brief.  
<http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/documents/methodology/approach%20brief%20final%20A4comp2.doc>

Leksmono, C., Young, J., Hooton, N., Muriuki, H. and Romney, D. (2006) *Informal Traders Lock Horns with the Formal Milk Industry: The role of research in pro-poor dairy policy shift in Kenya*. ODI/ILRI Working Paper 266. ODI, London.

[http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/documents/Kenya\\_dairy\\_policy\\_WP\\_final.pdf](http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/documents/Kenya_dairy_policy_WP_final.pdf)

## Resources:

**This 'Resources' section will be considerably expanded for the final version of the booklet**

### RAPID Tools:

**These Toolkits are all available to download for free from:  
[www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications)**

Nash, Robert, Alan Hudson and Cecilia Luttrell (2006) *Mapping Political Context: A Toolkit for Civil Society Organisations*, RAPID Toolkit, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London.

Ramalingam, Ben (2006) *Tools for Knowledge and Learning: A guide for development and humanitarian organisations*, RAPID Toolkit, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London.

Sutcliffe, Sophie and Julius Court (2006) *A Toolkit for Progressive Policymakers in Developing Countries*, RAPID Toolkit, Overseas Development Institute (ODI),

London.

Hovland, Ingie (2005) *Successful Communication: A Toolkit for Researchers and Civil Society Organisations*, RAPID Toolkit, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London.

Start, Daniel and Ingie Hovland (2004) *Tools for Policy Impact: A Handbook for Researchers*, RAPID Toolkit, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London.

**Other Resources:**

Blagescu, Monica and John Young (2005) *Partnerships and Accountability: Current thinking and approaches among agencies supporting Civil Society Organisations*, ODI Working Paper 255, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London (available at [www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications)).

Chowdhury, Naved, Chelsie Finlay-Notman and Ingie Hovland (2006) *CSO Capacity for Policy Engagement: Lessons Learned from the CSPP Consultations in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, ODI Working Paper 272, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London (available at [www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications)).

Court, Julius, Ingie Hovland and John Young (Eds) (2005) *Bridging Research and Policy in Development: Evidence and the Change Process*, ITDG Publishing.

Court, Julius, Enrique Mendizabal and David Osborne (2006) *Civil Society Organisations, Evidence Use and Policy Influence: What Do We Know?* ODI Working Paper. London: ODI (available at [www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications)).

Kornsweig, Jillian, David Osborne, Ingie Hovland and Julius Court (2006) *CSOs, Policy Influence, and Evidence Use: A Short Survey*, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London (available at [www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications)).

Mendizabal, Enrique (2006) *Building Effective Research Policy Networks: Linking Function and Form*, ODI Working Paper 276, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London (available at [www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications)).

Mendizabal, Enrique (2006) *Understanding Networks: The Functions of Research Policy Networks*, ODI Working Paper 271, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London (available at [www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications)).

OECD (1981) *The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development*. Paris: OECD.

Young, John and Julius Court (2004) *Bridging Research and Policy in International Development: An Analytical and Practical Framework*, RAPID Briefing Paper 1, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London (available at [www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications](http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/publications)).

## **APPENDIX 2:**

### **Workshop Presentations and Case Study Briefs**

In order to reduce file size, this version of the workshop Appendices includes only website links for downloading of the presentations. If you want a version of this document that includes images of all the slides (3MB pdf) please e-mail Nick Hooton at [n.hooton@cgiar.org](mailto:n.hooton@cgiar.org).

#### **Initial presentation:**

1. [Making Knowledge Count: Maximising the value of research for development](http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/ODI%20intro_compressed.ppt)  
[http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/ODI%20intro\\_compressed.ppt](http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/ODI%20intro_compressed.ppt)

#### **Presentations on case study summaries:**

2. [Summary of case study 1: Dairy marketing policy in Kenya](http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/Case%20study%201%20summary%20-%20Kenya%20dairy.ppt)  
<http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/Case%20study%201%20summary%20-%20Kenya%20dairy.ppt>
3. [Summary of case study 2: Development of urban agriculture ordinances in Kampala](http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/Case%20study%202%20summary%20-%20Kampala%20urban%20agriculture.ppt)  
<http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/Case%20study%202%20summary%20-%20Kampala%20urban%20agriculture.ppt>
4. [Summary of case study 3: Redistribution of communal land in Tigray, Ethiopia](http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/case%20study%203%20summary%20-%20Tigray%20communal%20land.ppt)  
<http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/case%20study%203%20summary%20-%20Tigray%20communal%20land.ppt>
5. [Summary of case study 4: Regional policy changes in seed trade and dairy marketing](http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/case%20study%204%20summary%20-%20regional%20seed%20and%20dairy%20policy.ppt)  
<http://www.pppppc.org/content/files/Presentations/case%20study%204%20summary%20-%20regional%20seed%20and%20dairy%20policy.ppt>

The full presentations and briefs can be downloaded from project website at <http://www.pppppc.org/Project/Key-lessons/Guiding-Principles-Workshop.asp>

## Case Study Brief No 1: Changes in dairy marketing policy in Kenya

This brief outlines a case study conducted by the International Livestock Research Institute's (ILRI's) and Overseas Development Institute's (ODI's) 'Process and Partnership for Pro-poor Policy Change' project, which seeks to identify and institutionalise innovative research and development approaches that lead to pro-poor policy outcomes. A new approach to policy process analysis was used, outlined in the accompanying brief: *'An Approach to Understanding the Role of Research in Policy Processes'*.

### Background – Kenya's informal dairy market



In Kenya, traditional milk markets from small-scale farmers through small-scale milk vendors (SSMVs) supply over 85% of the market, selling cheaper milk for poor consumers and giving better prices for farmers. Yet previous policies did not reflect the needs of the majority of farmers, traders and consumers. This was reflected in harassment and rent-seeking as the larger powerful players, linked to those in authority, sought to increase their small market share. The Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) relied on a western model of processing and packaging of milk, actively discouraging SSMVs and acting as 'policemen', trying to stamp them out.

### The policy change

Since 2004, there has been a major change in policy and practice towards the informal milk market. A newly drafted Dairy Policy clearly acknowledges the role of SSMVs, with specific measures including development of low-cost appropriate technologies, training on safe milk handling, provision of incentives for improved milk handling and establishment of a supportive certification system. Whilst written policy change is still in progress, the changed attitude and behaviour of policy implementers has been noticeable for some time now, reflected in changes in the market. There is proactive engagement by the KDB in training and certification of SSMVs, in order to safeguard public health and assure quality, rather than by trying to stamp it out.

### The Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP)

SDP was a research and development project that ran from 1997 to 2004, collaboratively implemented by the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). SDP conducted extensive participatory socio-economic, policy and technical research to understand the constraints affecting Kenya's milk market, before implementing a strategy to influence policy reform towards a more conducive system for small-scale farmers and traders.

A range of stakeholders came together, facilitated by the project, representing public, private and civil society organisations. SDP drew on its comprehensive research outputs to demonstrate novel institutional approaches and appropriate technology for quality assurance to safeguard both public health and the livelihoods of the poor who depend on the market.

### Case study findings

#### Key influences

This case study highlighted a 'tipping point' in changes in attitudes leading to the behaviour change and ultimately the policy change (see Figure 1). This occurred in early 2004, following a campaign for 'Safe Milk' led by large scale processors and the KDB. Reaction to this campaign by a coalition of advocacy NGOs using SDP evidence, in support of the SSMVs and livelihoods of farmers and consumers, led to the 'Milk Wars', largely conducted in the media. This opened the way for the key




evidence to be taken on board by policy makers, under pressure from grass roots organisations arguing for the same changes. However this change was enabled by several years of communication of relevant evidence by SDP, challenging attitudes with evidence that had previously been absent.

It was widely acknowledged that SDP's activities had been the major influence on the policy change, and the reasons for included:

- Highly effective long-term **collaboration**, producing robust, relevant **evidence** to make a credible story.
- Consistent **communication** of this evidence to a wide range of stakeholders using a **range of different materials and means**.
- A **political environment** providing opportunities for change –government strategies and freedom for civil society organisations.
- Awareness of the **political context** and effective links with advocacy-focused **NGOs**.
- Wide ranging linkages so that evidence could feed into the policy process via several routes – direct to policy makers in meetings, to public through media, through NGOs.

**Figure 1: Simplified representation of policy change process and influences**



## Key lessons

- **Effective collaboration** can be a combination of long-term relationships and tactical use of new linkages. But this involves **significant time investment**.
- **Robust, credible evidence** is hugely important in controversial environments. SDP evidence stood up to concerted efforts to discredit it.
- **Flexibility** of projects to change activities to new, relevant areas helps to respond to policy priorities and opportunities.
- External pressure and support from donors to focus on policy and livelihoods can help turn research outputs into policy outcomes.
- **Multiple approaches to communicate evidence** and influence key people are more effective than just a few.
- Approaches and messages that appeal to the **personal incentives** of key policy makers also increase likelihood of influence. The evidence is only one pressure on such people.

## More information

The full case study report has been published as an ODI/ILRI Working paper: Leksmono, Young, Hooton, Muriuki & Romney (2006) *'Informal Traders Lock Horns with the Formal Milk Industry: The role of research in pro-poor policy shift in Kenya'* ODI/ILRI Working Paper 266.

More details are also available from the websites of both the Smallholder Dairy Project [www.smallholderdairy.org](http://www.smallholderdairy.org) and the Process and Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy Change project [www.pppppc.org](http://www.pppppc.org).

## Case Study Brief No 2: New City Ordinances on urban agriculture in Kampala

This brief outlines a case study conducted by the International Livestock Research Institute's (ILRI's) and Overseas Development Institute's (ODI's) 'Process and Partnership for Pro-poor Policy Change' project, which seeks to identify and institutionalise innovative research and development approaches that lead to pro-poor policy outcomes. A new approach to policy process analysis was used, outlined in the accompanying brief: '*An Approach to Understanding the Role of Research in Policy Processes*'.

### Background – Urban agriculture in Kampala

Urban agriculture has always been part of Kampala's economy, playing a key food security role in the turbulent last few decades. Today almost half of Kampala's land is used for agriculture, involving some 30% of households. Growing crops and keeping livestock are an important source of food and income for the poor, especially women, for employment, using otherwise unproductive land, and recycling of waste amongst other benefits. However, in Kampala as elsewhere, there have long been concerns about public health risks, nuisance, traffic and crime risks. Planners have not considered agriculture to be consistent with an urban environment.



### The policy change

Against the background described above, the policy environment affecting urban agriculture in Kampala had for many years been very unsupportive. In general, the practice was simply not recognised in policy. Laws dating from colonial times were interpreted as prohibiting the practice, even though there was little or no mention of agriculture. Overall there was a state of confusion; agriculture was seen as a marginal activity, and crops were repeatedly slashed and livestock confiscated.

In May 2005, the Mayor of Kampala gave his final assent to a set of five ordinances, acknowledging the legal right of residents to grow food and raise livestock within the city limits for individual or commercial purposes. This change is a significant achievement, as urban agriculture is at best only tacitly accepted across sub-Saharan Africa and is often banned. This case study analyses the process that led to new laws on urban agriculture in Kampala and the associated changes in attitude and behaviour of key actors.

### Case study findings

#### Key events and influences:




Urban farmers themselves have been key actors in the policy change process, in continuing to farm despite the negative environment. But despite the importance of urban agriculture, detailed information about its practice and role was lacking before seminal PhD research carried out by Daniel Maxwell in the early 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, agricultural extension officers continued to support activities of urban farmers despite the negative attitudes towards them, and general lack of support from the city council. In doing this, they started linking with NGOs working in the city, supporting urban agriculture as part of their food security activities.

Decentralisation in 1993 effectively brought the elected politicians closer to their voters, including the large numbers of urban farmers, whose needs they became more aware of. And in 1997, the Local Government Act gave local authorities, including Kampala City Council (KCC) law-making powers,

making them responsible for formulating and implementing legislation in line with overarching national legislation. A review of outdated Ordinances in 1999 led to draft new ordinances which included some on urban agriculture.

International research into urban agriculture had been progressing steadily in the 1990s. These international initiatives linked increasingly with actors in Kampala leading to a more formal coalition of local government, NGO, national and international research actors into KUFSAALCC (Kampala Food Security Agriculture and Livestock Coordination Committee) which continued the research and development activities that had developed informally during the 1990s. This culminated in a widespread community consultation process, linking the community input to research evidence on role of agriculture and risk management, leading to a redrafting of the draft ordinances. Further financial and technical support – channelled through KUFSAALCC – facilitated the formal process of harmonising and passing these Ordinances.

**Figure 1: Representation of Kampala UA Ordinance policy process 1990-2006**



### Key lessons

- Decentralisation and devolved decision-making can provide an effective context for stakeholders to take advantage of and use evidence to influence policy changes.
- Individual ‘champions’ in key positions within organisations, and in political positions can play key roles. These can be identified and strategies developed to maximise their role.
- Collaboration between actors – government, NGOs, national and international researchers – can make effective coalitions for change, especially when trust builds over several years.
- Participation and consultation links evidence to real stakeholders and can be very powerful.
- Research which asks the right policy questions from the outset can be very influential, although it may take some time for the political context to support change.
- Evidence feeds into a policy process in different ways – but field visits can be highly effective.
- A mix of evidence – answering both the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions for change – can influence both the political and technical individuals in key positions.
- Timely use of resources to facilitate technical policy process ‘bottlenecks’ can enable change.

### More information

The full case study report has been published as a collaborative research report: Hooton, N., Lee-Smith, D., Nasinyama, G. and Romney, D., in collaboration with Atukunda, G., Azuba, M., Kaweesa, M., Lubowa, A., Muwanga, J., Njenga, M. and Young, J. (2007) *Championing urban farmers in Kampala; Influences on local policy change in Uganda*. ILRI Research Report No. 2, in collaboration with ODI, Urban Harvest and KUFSAALCC. International Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya. 92pp. More details are also available on the Process and Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy Change project website [www.pppppc.org](http://www.pppppc.org).

## Case Study Brief No 3: Redistribution of communal land in Tigray, Ethiopia

This brief outlines a case study conducted by the International Livestock Research Institute's (ILRI's) and Overseas Development Institute's (ODI's) 'Process and Partnership for Pro-poor Policy Change' project, which seeks to identify and institutionalise innovative research and development approaches that lead to pro-poor policy outcomes. A new approach to policy process analysis was used, outlined in the accompanying brief: *'An Approach to Understanding the Role of Research in Policy Processes'*.

### Background – Communal natural resources management in Tigray



As in other areas of Ethiopia, Tigray faces twin problems of an increasing population farming on limited land, with available land affected by degradation (including declining fertility, erosion and deforestation). All land is state-owned, with cultivable land allocated for the use of individual households. With little additional land available for cultivation, the new government ceased to redistribute any more land after 1991. Whilst this, together with the recent introduction of land certification, has encouraged farmers to invest more in reversing degradation, it also means there is a growing number of landless individuals, especially young people. There is also communally managed land, usually used for livestock grazing (often hillsides and swampy land), forestry and collection of wood. These communal

resources are also affected by severe degradation because of overgrazing, over-use of the woody resources and generally poor management. Many initiatives have sought to address the problem of land degradation, usually technical activities such as building terraces, reclaiming eroded gully land and planting trees. Closure of areas to allow regeneration has also been encouraged. And whilst there have been some reported successes in some areas, the problem was still widely considered to be worsening. In the case of degraded communal land, communal initiatives did not seem to produce the incentives needed to manage it effectively.

### The policy change

In 1997 the Tigray regional administration passed the Hillside Guideline, intended to manage degraded hillside land. This promoted distribution of 'non-cultivable' degraded communal land to be managed by individuals, who received the benefit of produce consumed or sold. This policy addressed both the key issues of increased incentives to improve and manage degraded land, and also 'finding' land for the landless youth to access. Since 1997, the practice has been promoted by the Tigray Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BOARD) and more communities are using this policy innovation in combination with technical interventions. Communities decide which, if any, land should be distributed, the communal and individual investment for initial land improvement, and who should get individual access to such land. They also pass byelaws to cover the use of the land, including penalties for non-compliance. Whilst this communal land only represents a small proportion of the land affected by degradation, the initiative has proved popular both with communities and with both government and non-governmental support agencies. There are many examples of previously degraded land becoming productive and supporting the previously landless farmers. The policy is now being promoted in other regions, including Amhara, based on the Tigray experience. As yet, there is no overarching national policy covering this practice.




## Case study findings

### Key events and influences:

Much research has been done on land degradation and effective management of common property. However, in this case the major influence on the policy change was a community initiative. In Echmare village in 1993, the community proposed that degraded communal hillside forest land should be managed by individuals, as previous communal initiatives had failed. The BOARD supported Echmare in this initiative, helping to develop appropriate approaches and byelaws. As news of the successful initiative spread, nearby communities started similar initiatives. Within the BOARD, word spread through internal meetings and later through commissioned case studies. These studies fed into policy processes such as the Tigray Forest Action Plan, in turn influencing the Hillside Guidelines.

Formal research played little if any role in this change, nor did any influence from NGO activities or approaches – it seemed purely a process of a community-level initiative influencing an internal local government policy process, albeit with internally commissioned case studies. As decisions on management of communal land are ultimately made by the community, local influences, including people seeing with their own eyes, are the most powerful. BOARD staff responded to the experiences on the ground addressing real issues of degradation and landlessness, rather than research evidence that addressed similar issues. However, research may play more of a role in spreading awareness of a successful policy change more widely between regions of the country.

**Figure 1: Key influences and events leading to Hillside Guidelines**



### Key lessons

- Simple initiatives addressing locally-relevant NRM issues can result in local policy change.
- If NRM research is more closely linked to grass-roots practice – communities and service deliverers, findings may be more readily taken up in policy change.
- Seeing is believing and good news travels when people have seen the impact.
- Effective internal communication mechanisms within government bodies means evidence can spread effectively within organisations.
- Policy/institutional changes may need to be linked to technical interventions. Either on its own may fail to address the problem.

### More information

The case study report will be published by ILRI as a collaborative research report: Hooton, N. and Hagos, F. (2007) *Influences on natural resource management policy in Ethiopia: How a community initiative led to a new regional policy in Tigray*. More details are also available on the Process and Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy Change website [www.pppppc.org](http://www.pppppc.org).

## Case Study Brief No 4: Regional policy change on dairy and seed trade in East Africa

This brief outlines a case study conducted as part of the International Livestock Research Institute's (ILRI's) and Overseas Development Institute's (ODI's) 'Process and Partnership for Pro-poor Policy Change' project, which seeks to identify and institutionalise innovative research and development mechanisms and approaches that lead to pro-poor policy outcomes. A new approach to policy process analysis was used as outlined in the accompanying brief: '*An Approach to Understanding the Role of Research in Policy Processes*'. This case study differs from the others in that it applied a 'quick and dirty' version of the analysis to look at the influences on two regional policy processes supported the Eastern and Central Africa Programme for Agricultural Policy Analysis (ECAPAPA).

### Background – Regional policy on seed trade and dairy marketing

Agricultural policies in East Africa are predominantly set at national level. But given the relatively close economic ties between the constituent countries, harmonisation of policies has often been encouraged, especially with the development of the East African Community. ECAPAPA has been supporting attempts to harmonise and rationalise policies in two key areas – seed trade and the dairy sector. In both cases, having identified a key policy area, ECAPAPA's approach has essentially been one of data collection and analysis followed by facilitated dialogue between key actors (See Figure 1).

### Case study findings

#### **Regional seed trade policy**

##### **The issue:**



Cereals are hugely important in the region and supply of appropriate seed is likewise important. But seed supply relies on several stages, including development and testing of new varieties, certification and release of seeds, and marketing and distribution of seeds across different countries. Following liberalisation and the opening up of the market to national and international plant breeding and seed companies, the companies still faced the process of going through the inefficient public approval system, with no regional agreement on standards. There

were also complicated and inconsistent phytosanitary regulations for cross-border trade and poor systems for intellectual property rights. Amongst other efforts ECAPAPA sought to address some of these policy and regulatory problems through their policy analysis and dialogue approach.

**Policy change:** Following ECAPAPA's facilitating activities, some key changes in policies, regulations and behaviour have occurred. These include: (i) agreement on more efficient variety release procedures (ii) strengthened plant variety protection measures in some countries (iii) more efficient seed certification procedures, (iv) more appropriate phytosanitary controls and (v) more efficient import/export procedures. There has also been a noticeable change in attitude and behaviour between many of the key actors, who are now engaged in positive dialogue towards more change, whereas before there had often been distrust, especially between private and public sector actors.


#### **Regional dairy policy:**

**The issue:** Case study 1 on dairy marketing in Kenya outlines the key role of the informal raw milk market in Kenya, and the situation is similar in other countries in the region. Policies designed for a western industrialised dairy model have been inappropriate for the informal sector of the market which supports most of the livelihoods in the sector. Led by overwhelming consumer demand, small-scale milk vendors (SSMVs) have not been able access training nor be certified to operate. Against this background, genuine concerns about



quality and public health have been all but impossible for regulators to deal with. Harassment of SSMVs has had the effect of increasing consumer price and decreasing farm gate price for milk.

**Policy change:** Following on from the policy change in Kenya described in Case Study 1, regulators across the region are now more proactively engaging to train and certify SSMVs. And in 2006, dairy market regulators from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda recently agreed on a common approach to the training and certification of SSMVs, and procedures to facilitate cross border trade, including a common syllabus for training.



**Figure 1: ECAPAPA's way of working**

### **Key influences:**

While acknowledging the favourable environment, it seems that the recent progress towards rationalised and harmonised seed policies and the more harmonised dairy market policy has been largely influenced by the activities supported by ECAPAPA, and particularly its way of working:

Relevant evidence was collected and analysed with care, involving all key actors. The dairy change also drew heavily on evidence from Kenya's Smallholder Dairy Project. But critically, the evidence in both cases was effectively communicated through wide consultation and through sharing and discussion of this evidence on multiple occasions with key stakeholders from the relevant sectors.

Above all, the major influence has been through facilitating linkages. The wide engagement encouraged 'buy-in' to the whole process of policy reform, with stakeholders recognizing their role in the process. This has also led to better transparency and collaboration between actors in the relevant sectors, so changes are more likely to be actually implemented, and further changes to occur.

A key difference between the two cases has been the type of actor that has been targeted from the private sector. In the seed case, the informal seed sector has been largely ignored with progress being made in the formal commercial sector. In the dairy case, the opposite is true – engagement with SSMVs has enabled progress in the policies on the informal sector. The poverty-relevance of these differences may warrant some investigation.

### **Key lessons**

- Regional policymaking is a very different process from local or national policy processes. Policymakers are further removed from grassroots stakeholders affected by the decisions. Technocrats and higher-level actors play a key role. The interests of the poor may be difficult to feed to such processes other than via well-placed organisations with a pro-poor focus.
- At regional level, facilitating linkages and enabling dialogue is the most critical element for influencing change. Barriers to change include sensitivities between similar actors in different countries, and between different actor types.
- Use of evidence is important, and collection and analysis of such evidence should be done in the context of this close collaboration with the key policy actors.
- Evidence may have to be handled sensitively if particular actors face reduced roles.

### **More information**

The full report will be published by ILRI as a collaborative research report: Hooton, N. (2007) *Regional policy change in dairy marketing and seed trade policy in East Africa: An analysis of influences*. Details are also available on the Process and Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy Change project website [www.pppppc.org](http://www.pppppc.org) and ECAPAPA website: [www.asareca.org/ecapapa](http://www.asareca.org/ecapapa)

## **APPENDIX 3 – Transcripts of narrated participants’ stories:**

### **Story 1: Multi-Stakeholder Policy and Action Planning Process for urban agriculture in Accra**

I am going to talk about a project that is dedicated to the development of urban agriculture in West Africa and the location is Accra, Ghana. The policy formulation process is based on the fact that in Ghana there are a lot of people who are involved in urban agriculture, especially in the city of Accra metropolis. These people are largely under-represented in the policy formulation process, with the result that they tend to get marginalised. The International Water Management Institute, in collaboration with an organisation in the Netherlands called the ETC, have got on board to work with this group of under-represented urban farmers to try out a policy formulation process that can better represent them. This process has the acronym MPAP, which stands for Multi-stakeholder Process for Action Planning and policy design.

I will just say a few words about how MPAP operates. It is a multi-stakeholder process that aims to bring together all the major stakeholders in new forms of communication and dialogue, for situation analysis, action planning, decision-making, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. It actually aims to develop a robust way of sharing information and communication as far as policy formulation is concerned.

The MPAP also aims to develop partnerships and strengthen coalitions, promote ownership and commitment, create mutual benefits and trust, involve under-represented groups and integrate diverse viewpoints.

The cast list is a broad-based group. As I said, it is a multi-stakeholder group, including municipal administrators, members of parliament, NGOs, farmers, researchers, medical personnel, members of the national agricultural research system and religious groups, and this list is not exhaustive.

The challenge is the need to make Accra food secure, and there is recognition of the role that urban agriculture can play as a means of mitigating food insecurity and reducing urban poverty. There is also one key problem related to this, and that has to do with urban public health. In Accra, the people who are operating in the urban agricultural sector go in for waste-water re-use. You may know a bit about the problems of waste-water re-use, but it is a very big cause for concern in public health. This problem made it imperative to get together a group representing all aspects of human life, in order to come up with a policy that is capable of being long-lasting and robust.

The first step was to sensitise the key stakeholders to the issues and make them aware of the subject of urban agriculture and the importance of urban agriculture in terms of nutrition, economic benefits, and the contribution of agriculture to the economy of the city. Training was then conducted on what the MPAP process entails, and I have a copy of the handout that details this process. This is the basic tool used to enhance the capacity of those being enlisted in the policy formulation process, so that they all have a common orientation and strategy. The training around the MPAP process is then replicated and disseminated through the training of trainers.

Following this, a series of studies was commissioned to look at the different aspects of urban agriculture in Accra, and to pull together some of the issues that would come to the fore in discussing policy formulation in Accra. These are location specific and they are also time specific, so everybody can relate to the outcome of these studies. We are looking at a broad spectrum and diversity of studies, ranging from geographic mappings, to remote-sensing, to animal nutrition resources. The reports were then presented in a plenary. After the information had been gathered, the policy briefs were formulated in a participatory manner by the group. This involved members of parliament, municipal authorities, medical personnel and so on.

The most important lesson for us was that the policy formulation process should be conducted within a multi-stakeholder framework. We had a very good example of this in the group discussion yesterday,

about the success of a group from Kampala in getting support for their policy, even getting the Mayor to agree to it. However, you might find that a couple of months down the road, a new declaration by the heads of state will be issued preventing poultry from being reared within a certain perimeter of human residences, in order to protect the continent from the scourge of Avian Influenza. What happens to all those people who have invested in urban agriculture or poultry, who are affected by the new resolution of policy in Kampala? The second policy is now overriding this to allow the rearing of poultry within 10 kilometres of the city precinct, meaning that one policy is in effect shooting the other one down. By contrast, when the policy formulation process is carried out within a multi-stakeholder framework, as you find in the Accra situation, medical personnel have been at the forefront defending urban agriculture. This is an unusual scenario, but because there is a common ownership of the policy formulation process, it is easy to find a doctor or a lawyer advocating for something that does not seem directly related to his field. As a result, we think that the policy formulation process should be conducted in a multi-stakeholder framework; not doing so is likely to lead to too many complications.

The policy formulation process must also be dynamic and policy should be flexible enough to allow for change. If policy is not flexible it is going to break and it will not work. The key lesson is that multi-stakeholder involvement is necessary in the policy formulation process.

Thank you very much.

## **Story 2: The improvement in indigenous innovation influencing extension policy in Ethiopia**

My presentation is about an improvement to an innovation that farmers were using in Ethiopia, so the title is: "the improvement in indigenous innovation influencing extension policy in Ethiopia". Basically, we are told that Ethiopian soil is 30 percent Vertisols, which are very hard to use when they are dry. When it rains, they get waterlogged and we have to drain the water if anything is going to grow in them, and it is also very hard to work in. As a result, farmers had made an innovation whereby they were making a sort of fallow about one metre wide at the edge to drain the water and then they would flatten the beds to put their crops in. Using this system, they would produce about one crop per year. They would not be able to plant early in the season because they had to wait until most of the water was drained, so that the soils were workable and it was possible to plant.

A group of partners, including the former ILCA (International Livestock Centre for Africa), ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics), the Ministry of Agriculture, and the farmers, worked on this innovation and tried to improve on it, and they came up with the broad bed maker, which would make the fallows at the same time as flattening the beds. With this innovation, farmers were able to plant earlier, in the month of June, and by planting earlier, they were able to harvest earlier, around September time. After harvesting the first crop they were able to plant a second, meaning that they were able to produce two crops in a year. The first crop would often be white wheat, which had not been possible before they had this technology, because it is a crop that has to grow quickly. The later crop would be teff, chickpea or lentils.

The process that was undertaken was very consultative with all these different partners working together. A lot of the administration was within the country. The project started within the central part of Ethiopia, in a place called [inharwarwe?], I think it is near [holeta?]. This was in the early 1980s. Work started in 1983 and by 1986 a lot of demonstrations had been done within the country, popularising it and testing different versions. There were also feedback sessions with the different farmers and groups and so on.

At one point, the former President of the US, Jimmy Carter, and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, visited those sites. That was a turning point in many ways, because they were so impressed with the work that was going on that promoting that particular package became part of the government's extension policy. From this, it just took off and was pushed through the country and it is now a very common application serving farmers to go around the food security programmes [?].

What would be the lessons from this?

We felt that the main cause of the success was that the scientists and other groups were willing to learn from this innovation, and rather than just discarding it and working on something new, they decided to work with what already existed and improve on it. This probably helped to bring a sense of ownership and made it easier for farmers to buy in to it.

The wider consultation and involvement of many stakeholders was also a useful part of the process. Ultimately though, the most important thing was that we were able to get the highest office to recognise and support this particular innovation.

### **Story 3: Livestock policy relating to dairy goats in Tanzania**

The story that I am going to tell you was not designed with policy change as one of its objectives, but as we will see, at the end of the day, it results in policy adoption.

It is a story about the introduction of dairy goat farming in Tanzania. In the mid-1980s, a group of [xxx?] horticulture researchers were promoting horticultural production in a highly populated village located in the Uluguru Mountains, close to the university. It turned out that poultry and pigs, which were the main animals kept in the farming systems there, were not sufficient to provide adequate nutrition and adequate manure, which was required to maintain soil fertility in the intensively farmed farmsteads. A survey of the nutritional status of children in the area found that a significant proportion of the children were below the acceptable threshold of weight for age and other parameters.

A story emerges where the group of horticultural researchers encountered this problem at about the same time that another group of researchers, from the animal research department within the university, had introduced dairy goats in the department. The dairy goats were not performing very well in the university area, which was about 500 metres above sea level, but hot and humid. However, just 30 kilometres away was this location that was cooler, about 1200 metres above sea level, and where the farmers were facing these constraints in their farming systems.

We had three groups. There was the horticultural research group, which wanted to improve the nutritional status of children in the area and the utilisation of manure for maintaining soil fertility. There was the dairy goat group in the animal science department, who saw this as an opportunity to try out new technology, to introduce the dairy goats and the [xxx?] goats imported from Norway into a climate condition that was considered to be friendlier and less strenuous than the conditions in the university area. On the other hand, you had the farmers, who were curious, but unsure as to whether a mere goat could provide enough milk for her kids, let alone for sale or for home consumption – if goats' milk was consumable for humans at all. This was an area where there had been no cattle and people were not used to consuming any milk of any sort.

So what were the challenges?

Land was scarce and the price of commercial fertilisers had gone up following the economic liberalisation policies of the mid-1980s. Pig manure and poultry manure, which were the main source of farm manure, could not sustain the horticultural crops at the levels desired. Additional resources to maximise production on limited land resources were therefore required. Both the dairy cow and the dairy goat were considered as possible options. After intense dialogue between soil researchers and the horticultural farmers, and considering that land scarcity was the primary factor, they agreed to try out the dairy goat as an additional source of household income, a means to improve nutrition, and a source of manure.

They decided to start in a very modest way. They started with five champion farmers, based on their responsiveness to economic [adaptation?] in the horticultural research project. They began training in dairy goat husbandry and were helped at the university. The farmers used their own resources to invest in the construction of improved goat houses with flat floors, and this was followed by the

provision of two pregnant cross-bred dairy goats to the five initial farmers plus one buck, which was kept by one of the farmers and could be used for breeding the other goats.

Successful dairy goat husbandry by all the five farmers, using partial **circling**, and milking them only once, enabled them to get about half a litre to a litre per day from each goat, and produced enough surplus milk to provide improved nutrition for the children, as well as providing cash income from the sale of milk.

This was repeated over six cycles. Within ten years, about fifty households owned dairy goats. Data collection, analysis and feedback from the farmers was a regular feature of this programme. Dissemination through annual conferences of the **[xxx?]** animal production over a period of about ten years brought attention to the impact that this intervention had made on resource poor farmers. The message of the impact spread very fast to both policy-makers and people working in agricultural extension in various parts of the country.

The message has spread like wildfire and the dairy goat is in great demand these days and is hugely undersupplied. What brought about the turning point was probably the research organisations and other organisations, such as FARM-Africa and **[hyper?]** Project International, coming together and forming a network, called **Tangwa Net**, which helped to spread the evidence that dairy goats could actually change the livelihoods of resource poor farmers.

In the last five years or so, a new process for policy formulation in Tanzania has been adopted, mainly in response to civil society organisations in Tanzania wanting to be involved in policy formulation. These days, once policy has been formulated, it is exposed to public hearings and discussions. When a new livestock policy was first formulated (I think it has taken about 3 or 5 years now), the civil society organisations involved in poverty reduction and using dairy goats as one of their interventions, took this as an opportunity to voice the evidence that they have gathered over the years and the impact that they have witnessed in their own work to promote the goat as an instrument for addressing rural poverty. As a result of this, in the newly formulated livestock policy of dairy goat farming is accepted and advocated by the government as one of the key means of addressing rural poverty, including addressing issues for orphaned families relating to HIV/AIDS and so on.

What we learned from this research and interaction with civil society and policy-makers was that engaging farmers directly helps to demonstrate the evidence or impact of research and technology adoption much faster than would have been the case if this research had been based on **[station?]**. The other lesson we learned here was that the choice of technology to adopt was based on the socio-economic context of that particular locality – particularly with regard to land scarcity and the need to use animal manure to maintain soil fertility. One other innovative thing here is that we have seen two different research projects, with different objectives, coming together to introduce a new technology that addresses social need within that particular community.

Thank you very much.

#### **Story 4: Development of Biotechnology Policy in Kenya**

The story that I am going to tell you is about what led to the development of biotechnology policy in Kenya, and I want to highlight the projects that we started with, which finally led to the development of this particular policy. Between 1993 and 1996, the Biotechnology Trust Africa, which I work for, had a process of developing priority-setting with different stakeholders. The outcome of that priority-setting was the identification of some areas where there was a very clear need to use biotechnology applications.

One of these areas was the production of clean planting materials. This is where the tissue culture technology was picked up on, to produce clean planting materials, especially for bananas, cassava, and then sweet potatoes. Cassava at that time had this mosaic disease and we also had a lot of problems with our potatoes in terms of coming up with clean micro-tubas in order to be able to

produce certified potatoes. As a result of that, we established about five tissue culture projects that were based in both the universities and in the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI).

We also had other projects, one of which was working on the development and evaluation of the livestock vaccines (I think KARI took that one over). Then we had the isolation and evaluation of the natural BTs for this [phase?] – for the stock [boroughs?] in various parts of the country. This work was taken on by the University of Nairobi. We had another project that I think was mainly looking at drought and at drought tolerance and insect pest resistance using MAC-assisted selection.

Those were the areas that we finally focused on. We had all these projects underway in three institutions: the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, which had about five projects (including drought resistance for Maize and the vaccine, as well as several tissue culture laboratories); the University of Nairobi (which had one tissue culture for citrus, as well as [basilius fungesis] which I think they isolated from various parts of the country); and Jomo Kenyatta University, which was mainly centred on tissue culture for bananas. I think people from this country are aware that this institute has done quite a lot in this particular area.

When we started implementing these projects in 1997, one of the things that came out clearly was that the tissue culture for bananas in particular showed a very high increase in production. I think that interested a lot of people and the demand, even now, is extremely high – too high to cope with. We also had a few other problems and I will now turn to these and the challenges that arose.

People approached us about the fact that Kenya was already producing GMOs and we did not have the laws to govern that. This became quite a big issue. Another issue was that biotechnology was a relatively new technology and whilst most people were cautious, they did think that we were probably going the right way. There were some other constraints, like the drought, that could probably be better tackled through using some of the new technologies that we have introduced, like the MAC-assisted selection, to reduce the [...] for breeding.

When these projects were underway, a few companies came to visit the Ministries involved, particularly the Ministry of Science and Technology, and said that they would like to try out some of the GMOs that they had. This added to the pressure to develop this area and, as a result, one of the things that we included in our activities was work to develop guidelines for biotechnology, which we did with the National Council for Science and Technology. When these guidelines were introduced, the Ministry thought that they could probably use the guidelines to accept some of the GMOs, but there was still a lot of pressure being put on the government to go further and develop a legal framework, based on the view that guidelines alone would not be enough. We wanted to use the guidelines as a basis for developing the legal framework, but the politicians and other policy-makers said that there was no way we could have a legal framework without a policy. This caused some difficulties because we had to actually change our strategy and focus more on the development of the policy. The National Council for Science and Technology came in with several other donors to work on this, and the process for developing policy started.

Before I turn to some of the lessons learned from this sort of programme, I want to mention one more thing. When the process started in 2003, we made sure that we first developed the structure and then we brought in all the stakeholders to look at the initial draft that was developed. We had several groups looking at it, including politicians. They made their comments and the final main document was produced through the National Council for Science and Technology. Finally, last year in October, this document was approved by Cabinet. The legal framework that was developed alongside that was also approved by the Cabinet, although it is still awaiting publication and discussion in Parliament. Nonetheless, the actual policy has been passed, and I would say that it was the pressure from the different groups, including the developmental NGOs, which were very clear in setting out that they could not do biotechnology without policies and a legal framework, that has actually made the government move forward on developing these things.

In terms of the lessons learned, one thing that we saw was that [the incision of?] nanno-GM mobile technologies, like the tissue culture and other things that I have mentioned, actually stimulated the development of policy and the legal framework. People saw that something was developing without

there being any clear policy and legal framework; I think this helped in bringing in a lot of things to the policy table.

The second thing that came out very clearly was the importance of involving the stakeholders. Throughout the process, all the stakeholders were involved, from the farmers, to the community-based organisations, civil society organisations and all the other groups, including scientists. The comments that came out from that involvement in developing the policy and legal framework helped to inform the document and what should be included in it. I think that was very useful and the lesson here is that the involvement of stakeholders is extremely critical in the development of policy.

I think that the debate on GMO brought a lot of pressure to bear on the government to actually look into ways of developing this particular policy, so that even if that pressure was initially very destructive, I think that it helped a lot to push this policy development forwards.

Another good lesson to think about is that the initiation of new technology like this calls for capacity building and I think that the process helped a lot in building capacity in this area of biotechnology. We are now getting close to having enough scientists to do something about these biotechnology applications, including transformation.

I would also say that the pressure from some of the companies that had GMOs to introduce in Africa helped to give the government something to think about. Those companies that met with the government at that time, particular the Ministry of Science and Technology, pushed for the National Council for Science and Technology to be able to move forward and develop the legal framework, establish the National Bio-safety Committee, and develop these aspects.

Lastly, the involvement of the policy-makers, particularly politicians, at certain stages helps. They are the ones who say that the policy must come first before the legal framework, so that if you come to them with a legal framework, they will not be able to pass it until they have seen a policy.

Thank you very much.

## **Story 5: Land leasehold policy in Ethiopia**

Once upon a time, long long time ago (a third of a century ago to be precise), there was an emperor by the name of Haile Selassie and an empire called the Ethiopian empire. The story that I am going to tell you is about that country and about land policy. I want to start by putting the story in context and then tell you a bit about what has happened since in Ethiopia.

In 1975, following the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, the slogan of “land to the tiller”, for which many of us young students (as we were at that time) had fought, was realised in terms of the nationalisation of land. On 4<sup>th</sup> March 1975, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), also known as the Dergue, published a proclamation to nationalise all rural land, placing it under government ownership. The land was to be used by the Ethiopian people, but under government ownership. This meant that anyone whose livelihood was based on agriculture or farming could have access to a piece of land, but nobody would be allowed to use extra-family labour or engage in any commercial activity. Thus whilst the slogan under which the students and others had fought was “land to the tiller”, land came to be used by the tillers but under government ownership. After seventeen years of rule, the Dergue was overthrown and a transitional government was established, which was later replaced by the current federal democratic republic. The same policy continued under the transitional government.

The transitional government was set up in 1991. In 1992, there was an initiative by the UNDP and the World Bank which was known as the Forestry Action Plan. The Ethiopian Forestry Action Plan (EFAP) was already in the making when the military regime was overthrown and replaced by the current government. EFAP was led by, and conducting its activities through, the Coordination Office, and was using a number of experts drawn from the Ministry of Agriculture and so on. These people organised task forces, which used existing material, research outputs and so on, as well as generating new material. Then in 1992, a certain Swedish-Danish consultancy firm was brought in to the picture to

finalise this. Some six expatriates were brought in to work as consultants. Since I was in Sweden at the time, I was made a part of this consultancy group and we worked on finalising the EFAP initiative and coming up with the final recommendations.

We found out that one of the major constraints regarding forestry in Ethiopia was the lack of property rights on behalf of the land users, the forest users and the like. The task forces who had worked on this area before us were also in agreement that it would be impossible for Ethiopia to reverse its current trend of declining forest resources (which had declined from around 40 percent at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to some 2.5 percent) under the existing system. To make people plant trees, to make them care for trees and to make them utilise forestry resources wisely, would be impossible without giving them incentives by way of making them the major stakeholders in the whole forestry business, and that would come about only if the land was in some way made to stay with them. In other words, unless there was security of tenure, and unless people felt that they would stand to benefit from any future development or investment (such as investment in tree planting or forestry), it would be impossible to turn around that bleak scenario of forest decline.

We looked at the suggestions of the task forces and we found that they had actually recommended the privatisation of land. They had said that the new government should turn the corner and give the land not to the old landowners, but to the farmers themselves, to the land users, as their absolute private property. We did not agree, as we felt that the time was not right for this. We felt that we should go for something more realistic, and we thought that what was realistic and viable was not freehold as they suggested, but leasehold, under which the farmers would be given secure leaseholds for a period of 99 years. We were later advised by the World Bank to reduce the length of the lease to 35 years. Why 35 years? The most popular tree in Ethiopia is the Eucalyptus tree. If you plant that and you harvest it every seven years, you will stand to harvest at least five times from what you have invested, so we thought that this was reasonable.

We wanted to give incentives to the people and to the government, so we recommended that leaseholds should come with the condition that the farmers would be issued with leasehold certificates if they built fences (live and dead mixed fences) around their farms. One of the problems in Ethiopia, unlike in Kenya and other parts of Africa, is that we have open farms on which animals can roam and destroy whatever plantation there is, so there would need to be some kind of fence built around the plot. Aerial photographs would then be taken, which could simply be attached to a piece of paper that said that this plot, number x, is the leasehold property of this particular farmer. We would also then include conditions, for instance, that women or wives should be co-owners of the site. Mechanisms should also be introduced to discourage fragmentation as the leasehold is transferred from one generation to another.

We sensed that the government at that time (the new government) was rather suspicious of private ownership, and we wanted to allay its fear of land grabbers (in particular, the fear that the land would pass to only a few merchants who would have the money), so we introduced some safeguards. We said that first of kin principles should be used, meaning that the leasehold certificate can pass from one hand to another, but that brothers and next of kin and so on should be given the first opportunity to purchase or to rent the land. If there is no such interested kin, then a smallholder from the area should be given the opportunity to buy or rent the land before it can be transferred to anyone else.

We managed to build in safeguards such as these by arguing that the political atmosphere was not right for absolute private ownership of land. We felt that this policy reform would stand a chance, as we had built in all those safety valves.

However, I heard that when it was submitted to the government, they went through it with a red ink pen, cancelling out everything that had to do with land policy reform.

In 2000, Hernando de Soto wrote a book about why Capitalism flourishes in Europe but not elsewhere, and argued in favour of creating wealth for the rural poor in the form of land that they can use as collateral. Following the teachings of Hernando de Soto, in 2003 this idea finally became accepted by the current government. This is something like 12 years after the government had rejected our recommendations. Since 2003, this land policy has been introduced throughout the major

agricultural regions of Ethiopia. Some 50 percent of farmers are given or issued with some sort of land certificate recognising their usufruct rights (their right not to sell but to use the land, including renting it).

What are the lessons from this? The first lesson is that unless the political environment is right for a policy, no matter how reasonable that policy is, it will simply have to wait for the appropriate time. Policy is, in the final analysis, the job and product of policy-makers. Research and knowledge can only highlight alternative ways of doing something; the final decision is with the powers that be. We need to engage the policy-makers as much as possible and tirelessly try to gain proximity to them and try to put the idea forward. (When I say proximity, I do not necessarily mean physical proximity - though even physical proximity is not that bad!). Of course, the ideas or policy proposals that are put forward by academics in a Third World country do not have the same weight as when the same policy recommendations are made by donors, or even by academics like Hernando de Soto who have gained the ears of the donors and policy-makers.

Sometimes it is quite simply that ideas become popular when their time arrives. I am glad the time finally came for this idea. I am not sad that it did not work back then, but rather I am glad that it has finally caught up and has worked now, and I am happy that I have been blessed by god to be part of the show.

Thank you.

## **APPENDIX 4: Participant list**

### **Regional Workshop on Enhancing Pro-Poor Policy Outcomes 27<sup>th</sup>-28<sup>th</sup> March, ILRI, Nairobi**

| <b>NAME</b>         | <b>ORGANIZATION</b>         | <b>POSITION</b>                      | <b>ADDRESS</b>          | <b>TELEPHONE</b>            | <b>E-MAIL ADDRESS</b>  |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| Girma Aboma         | Water AID                   | Policy Research & Advocacy Officer   | Box 164 code 1032 Addis | 000 251 911 639461          | <a href="mailto:girmaboma@yahoo.com">girmaboma@yahoo.com</a>                 |
| Angela Wokabi       | Ministry of Livestock Kenya | Head Dairy & Beef Branch             | Box 34188 Nairobi       | '254-20 271852/ 0724 710632 | <a href="mailto:sdp-ma@africaonline.co.ke">sdp-ma@africaonline.co.ke</a>     |
| Isaac K Ngugi       | Tegemeo Institute           | Research Fellow                      | Box 20498 00200 NRB     | 254-20 2717818              | <a href="mailto:ikomo@tegemeo.org">ikomo@tegemeo.org</a>                     |
| Jean Ndikumana      | ILRI/ASARECA                | A-AARNET Coordinator                 | Box 30709 NRB 00100     | 254 -20 4223000             | <a href="mailto:j.ndikumana@cgiar.org">j.ndikumana@cgiar.org</a>             |
| Mary Ngenga         | Urban Harvest - CIP         | Research Officer                     | Box 25171 NRB 00603     | 254-20 4223606              | <a href="mailto:m.njenga@cgiar.org">m.njenga@cgiar.org</a>                   |
| Julius Nyangaga     | ILRI                        | Research Associate                   | Box 30709 NRB 00100     | 254-20 4223000              | <a href="mailto:j.nyangaga@cgiar.org">j.nyangaga@cgiar.org</a>               |
| Juan A Landeo       | CIP                         | Senior Potato Genetics Breeder       | Box 25171 NRB 00603     | 254-20 4223610              | <a href="mailto:j.landeo@cgiar.org">j.landeo@cgiar.org</a>                   |
| Margaret S Azuba    | Kampala City Council        | District Extn/Production Co-ord.     | Box 281 Kampala         | 256-77 2456140              | <a href="mailto:msazuba@yahoo.com">msazuba@yahoo.com</a>                     |
| Sarah Gibbons       | OXFAM                       | ROSP Manager                         | Box 40680 NRB 00100     | 254-20 2820144              | <a href="mailto:sgibbons@oxfam.org.uk">sgibbons@oxfam.org.uk</a>             |
| Hezekiah G. Muriuki | Researcher                  | Researcher                           | Box 52370 NRB 00200     | 254-2 0733 631753           | <a href="mailto:gichere@wananchi.com">gichere@wananchi.com</a>               |
| Yemi Akinbamijo     | AU-IBAR                     | Chief Animal Resources Officer       | Box 30786 NRB 00100     | 254-20 3674218              | <a href="mailto:yemi.akinbamijo@au-ibar.org">yemi.akinbamijo@au-ibar.org</a> |
| Megan Lloyd-Laney   | DFID                        | Communication Advisor                | Palace Street - London  | 0207 023 0017               | <a href="mailto:m-lloyd-laney@dfid.gov.uk">m-lloyd-laney@dfid.gov.uk</a>     |
| Maria Kaweesa       | Environmental Alert         | Prg. Officer Food security/nutrition | Box 11259 Kampala       | 256-41 510215               | <a href="mailto:mkawesa@envalert.org">mkawesa@envalert.org</a>               |
| Obongo Nyachae      | Seed Trade Ass. Of Kenya    | Chief Executive Officer              | Box 2581 NRB 00202      | 254-20 2713619              | <a href="mailto:stak@kenyaweb.com">stak@kenyaweb.com</a>                     |
| Ngendahayo Liboire  | Ministry Livestock Burundi  | Advisor in the Ministry Cabinet      | Bujumbura               | 00257 22226883              | <a href="mailto:ldngenda@yahoo.fr">ldngenda@yahoo.fr</a>                     |
| Sachindra M Das     | Ministry Livestock Tanzania | Director - Animal Disease Institute  | Box 9254 Daressalaam    | 255-078 4464086             | <a href="mailto:sachindas_30@hotmail.com">sachindas_30@hotmail.com</a>       |
| Dianna Akullo Oyena | NARO                        | Research Officer Quality assurance   | Box 295 Kampala         | 256-77 2465103              | <a href="mailto:diana.akullo@wur.nl">diana.akullo@wur.nl</a>                 |
| Gezahegn Ayele      | Ethiopian Dev Institute     | Head of Agriculture Department       | Box 2479 Addis Ababa    | 025 115 506066              | <a href="mailto:ayeleg2002@yahoo.com">ayeleg2002@yahoo.com</a>               |
| Yeraswork Admassie  | Forum Social Studies FFS    | Board Member                         | Box 25864 Addis 1000    | 251 11 157 2990/91          | <a href="mailto:fss@ethionet.et">fss@ethionet.et</a>                         |

|                     |                            |                                    |                           |                      |  |
|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--|
| Juliet Sentumbwe    | Ministry of Agriculture    | Principal Veterinary Officer       | Box 102 Entebbe           | 256-41 320864        | <a href="mailto:jusekaoc@yahoo.com">jusekaoc@yahoo.com</a>               |
| Jamie Watts         | Bioversity International   | Head Institutional Learning Unit   | Via Dei Tre Denari 472/a  | 39 066118253         | <a href="mailto:j.watts@cgiar.org">j.watts@cgiar.org</a>                 |
| Muhamed Bizimana    | Care International         | Great Lakes Advocacy Co-ord.       | Box 550 Kigali            | 00 250 583147        | <a href="mailto:muhamedb@care.org.rw">muhamedb@care.org.rw</a>           |
| Simon P Rutabajuuka | Centre for Basic Research  | Executive Director                 | Box 23698 Kampala         | 256-41 4342879       | <a href="mailto:srutabajuka@cbr-ug.org">srutabajuka@cbr-ug.org</a>       |
| Frank Place         | ICRAF                      | Theme Leader/Economist             | Box 30677 Nairobi         | 254-20 7224000       | <a href="mailto:f.place@cgiar.org">f.place@cgiar.org</a>                 |
| Patrick Ngwediagi   | Ministry of Agriculture    | Registrar of Plant Breeders Rights | Box 9192 Dar-es-salam     | 255-22 2861404       | <a href="mailto:ngwedi@yahoo.com">ngwedi@yahoo.com</a>                   |
| Lusato Kurwijila    | Sokoine University Agri    | Professor                          | Box 3004 Morogoro         | 255-23 2604617       | <a href="mailto:kurwiji@suanet.ac.tz">kurwiji@suanet.ac.tz</a>           |
| Dennis Rewyemamu    | Economic & Social Org      | Co-ord of Commissioned Studies     | Box 31226 Dar-es-salaam   | 255-22 760260        | <a href="mailto:drweyemamu@esrf.or.tz">drweyemamu@esrf.or.tz</a>         |
| Belete Tafere       | Bureau of Agri. & Rural    | Deputy Head                        | Box 10 Makele, Tigray     | 000 251 0941 720998  | <a href="mailto:btafere2001@yahoo.com">btafere2001@yahoo.com</a>         |
| Michael Waithaka    | Asareca - Ecapapa          | Co-ordinator                       | Box 765 Entebbe           | 256-41 321777        | <a href="mailto:m.waithaka@asareca.org">m.waithaka@asareca.org</a>       |
| Joseph Wekundah     | Biotechnology Trust Africa | Executive Director                 | Box 1285 NRB 00100        | 254-20 600040/603358 | <a href="mailto:bta@clubinternetk.com">bta@clubinternetk.com</a>         |
| Fitusm Hagos        | IWMI                       | Researcher                         | Box 5689 c/o ILRI Addis   | 251 911 559616       | <a href="mailto:f.hagos@cgiar.org">f.hagos@cgiar.org</a>                 |
| Samuel Mwakubo      | KIPPRA                     | Analyst                            | Box 56445 Nairobi         | 254-20 271993314     | <a href="mailto:smwakubo@kippra.or.ke">smwakubo@kippra.or.ke</a>         |
| Patti Kristjanson   | ILRI                       | Scientists                         | Box 30709 NRB 00100       | 254-20 4223000       | <a href="mailto:p.kristjanson@cgiar.org">p.kristjanson@cgiar.org</a>     |
| John Young          | ODI                        | Director of Programmes - RAPID     | 111 Westminster Bridge Rd | 44 20 7922 0300      | <a href="mailto:j.young@odi.org.uk">j.young@odi.org.uk</a>               |
| Keith Sones         | ILRI                       | Consultant                         | Box 24720 NRB 00502       | 254-20 890051        | <a href="mailto:ksones@africaonline.co.ke">ksones@africaonline.co.ke</a> |
| Nick Hooton         | ILRI                       | Scientists                         | Box 30709 NRB 00100       | 254-20 4223000       | <a href="mailto:n.hooton@cgiar.org">n.hooton@cgiar.org</a>               |
| Dannie Romney       | CABI Africa                | Co-ord. Knowledge & Innovation     | P.O. Box 633-00621, NRB   | 254-20 7224450/59    | <a href="mailto:d.romney@cabi.org">d.romney@cabi.org</a>                 |